OPINION: After Gabon, where will the next coup be?

In Sub-Saharan Africa, the dawn of multi-party democracy and the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s renewed hope of a third wave of democratic government that would contribute to an end of the African strongman and disintegration of the neo-patrimonial state. Neo-patrimonial states are countries where the government of the few, for the few and by the few elites dominate the political space.

Looking at the recent coup in Gabon, the Bongo family dynasty illustrates how badly the hopes for democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa were dashed. Self-made rulers found ways to stay in power by constitutionally clinging to power via unconstitutional means.

What was supposed to be the democratic transition of the Third Wave of democracy in the early 1990s, degenerated into semi authoritarian states where nothing much changed from the single-party era to the resultant multi-party context. Gabon became a poster child for autocratic rule that buttressed a dynasty of one family capturing the resources of the state and using all state institutions to its advancement and perpetuation.

Nothing changed from the early 1990s to the present day other than the handover of power from father to son in the shape of Omar Bongo handing power to Ali Bongo Ondimba. After the coup in Gabon, what country will be next? 

In response to this question, context is key. Most of the 13 coups between 2020 and 2023 have occurred in Francophone Africa. The most recent coup in Gabon had its own unique context. This is important in predicting where the next coup might occur.

Firstly, internal dynamics in Gabon around the lack of legitimacy of the Bongo dynasty hastened the hand of the military as the strongest institution outside the presidency that could facilitate regime change.

Over the almost 60 years of the Bongo dynasty, the military had become coopted in rent taking of the largesse of the Gabonese state as its part of the compact to maintain the Bongo’s in power.

Fearing civil unrest after a flagrantly rigged 2023 election, the army sought to preempt civilian overthrow of the regime by acting first. This way, the military would have control over the direction (or lack of direction) of any transition to democratic rule.

Secondly, Gabon’s oil curse severely constrained the state. Rentier states, that is oil rich countries where hydrocarbons become a curse rather than a blessing, allowed the Bongo family to pocket close to 18% of the revenue from all oil contracts in the country according to Democracynow.org.

With the volatile nature of oil prices, the slowdown in global production and supply chain challenges after the COVID-19 crisis, the Gabonese economy found itself in dire straits. In addition to this, Gabon could no longer count on France’s Rapid Deployment Force to save the regime as Paris kept Libreville at arm’s length.

The Macron Administration failed to offer the regime the military assurance of French intervention. The special relationship between France and its former colonies known as La Francophonie, was at an end.

Lastly, the contagion factor of the coups in the Sahel belt and in the majority of Francophone nations of that region had a spillover effect in Gabon. The masses saw regimes of erstwhile strong men being toppled by the military. Ali Bongo’s regime was living on borrowed time. 

In conclusion, after Gabon, where will the next coup be? Going by the post-2020 trend in Sub Sharan Africa, it is more likely than not the next coup will come from a Francophone country in Central Africa. With almost all the West African Francophone nations having experienced coups, the contagion seems to have spread to French Central Africa.

Most at risk are oligarchs like Ali Bongo that have been in power for a long time. This puts Cameroon under Paul Biya, its former Spanish colony neighbour to Southwest Equatorial Guinea under Teodoro Nguema Obiang Mangue and Cameroon’s Francophone neighbour Congo Brazzaville under Denis Sassaou Nguesso in a delicate position. 

The Gabon contagion is also threatening to Congo Brazzaville because of the close familial ties between the Bongos and Denis Sassou Nguesso. Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea and Congo all also share borders with Gabon, all produce significant volumes of oil and have rulers that have been in power for over two decades or more. The Central African region is therefore uncomfortably in the bullseye of the next military intervention. 

Professor Monda teaches political science, international relations and foreign policy at the City University of New York. @dmonda1, davidmonda.com